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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GEORGE N. ANDERSON and wife, IMOGENE 
T. ANDERSON, LORENZO W. ANDERSON, here-
tofore known as LORENZO W. ANDERSON, JR., 
and wife HAZEL 11. ANDERSON, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs 
~IARIE T. JOHNSON and CHESTER N. JOHN-
SON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
ADDITIONAL STATE11:ENT OF FACTS 
Lorenzo W. Anderson, a widower, died on or about 
the 22nd day of June, 1949, at Brigham City, Box Elder 
County, Utah, leaving as his sole and only surviving 
heirs plaintiffs George N. Anderson and Lorenzo "'. 
Anderson, Jr., sons, and Marie T. Anderson Johnson, 
daughte:r. By their :amended complaint George N. 
Anderson and Imogene T. Anderson, his wife, Lorenzo 
W. Anderson and Hazel M. Anderson, his wife, filed 
this action in the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah in and for Box Elder 
County against :Marie T. Anderson Johnson and Chester 
N. Johnson, her husband. In the amended complaint 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it is alleged that the plaintiffs Ren and George and the 
daughter Marie are the sole and only heirs-at-laws of 
deceased. It is further alleged in paragraph two that the 
deceased left estate consisting of real and personal pro-
perty in Box Elder County. Plaintiffs then allege that 
during the month of March, 1943, the deceased made, exe-
cuted and delivered several warranty deeds, one deed 
to Ren and wife as joint tenants in what is designated as 
tracts numbered 1 and 2, another deed to George and 
wife, and a third deed to Marie and Chester 
The complaint further alleges that in 1946, George 
obtained a new deed from his father in lieu of his 1943 
deed. 
The complaint then alleges that the defendants on 
or about the 7th day of February, 1949, at a time when 
the decedent was incompetent, and by exercising undue 
influence on the deceased, obtained new deeds wherein 
the deceased left George out entirely; that he deeded 
the home and the Promontory farm to defendants and 
the Garland farm to Ren, but it is alleged that these 
deeds are void. The plaintiffs pray judgment estab-
lishing the validity of the 1943 deeds and declaring the 
1949 deeds to be void. 
The defendants by their answer denied the vali-
dity of the 1943 deeds and asserted that the 1949 deeds 
were valid. The pleadings require some analysis. The 
plaintiffs in effect say that the 1943 deeds are valid 
and if valid, the deceased left no estate. They then in 
effeet say that if the 1943 deeds are not valid, neither 
are the 1949 deeds, and therefore the property des-
cended to the heirs-at-law. On the other hand the de-
fendants say that the 1943 deeds are invalid and that 
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the 1949 deeds are valid, but if the 1949 deeds are also 
invalid, then the property is an asset of the d~r.~ased 
and passed to his heirs. It is our understanding that 
the only question raised by the plaintiffs and appel-
lants concerns the application of the so called dead 
man's statute, and the six statements of points relied 
on by appellants deal exclusively with this question. 
We shall therefore confine our argument to this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. Section 104-49-2, U. C. A., 1943, in so far 
as it is applicable to the case in question, provides as 
follows: 
''The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
(3) A party to any civil action, suit or proceed-
ing and any person directly interested in the 
event thereof and any person from, through 
or under whom such party or interested per-
son derives his interest or title or any part 
thereof, when the adverse party to such action, 
suit or proceeding claims or opposes, sues or 
defends as .... heir, legatee or devisee of any 
deceased person, .... as to any statement by, 
or transaction with, such deceased . . . . . or 
matter of fact whatever, which must have been 
equally within the knowledge of both the wit-
ness and such ... deceased person, unless such 
witness is called to testify thereto by such ad-
verse party so claiming or opposing, suing or 
defending in such action, suit or proceeding.'' 
As stated by Mr. Justice Larsen in the case of 
Maxfield vs. Sainsbury 
110 Utah 280 
172 Pac. 2nd 122 
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"The cases like the language of the statute are 
not entirely free from confusion.'' 
The question presented to this court involves the 
application and construction of this statute as applied 
to the undisputed facts. The four plaintiffs all claim 
an interest in the property as grantees of the deceased 
under the 1943 deeds. With respect to these deeds the 
sole and only issue was whether or not the deceased, 
during his lifetime, made a valid legal delivery of the 
deeds. The evidence shows conclusvely that the deeds 
were never recorded, no life estate was reserved therein 
and that the deeds remained in the possession and under 
the control of the deceased until shortly before his death 
when he directed that these old deeds be destroyed after 
the execution and delivery of the 1949 deeds. The plain· 
tiffs claim to be the owners of this property as grantees. 
Therefore, each and all of them are not only parties to 
the action but they are claiming a direct interest in the 
subject matter of the suit. They brought this suit 
against their sister. Therefore, all of the heirs-at-law 
are before the court as parties. They could have brought 
the suit against an adminstrator of the estate of the 
deceased, or they were within their rights in bringing 
the suit by joining all of the heirs either as plaintiffs 
or defendants. The defendant Marie T. Johnson is the 
only other heir of the deceased. There can be no ques-
tion but what the plaintiffs are parties to a civil action 
and that they are also each and all directly interested 
in the event thereof. The only question then for deter-
mination is the postion of the defendant Marie T. John-
son. It is our contention, and it was the view of the 
trial court, that in so far as the question of the validity 
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of the 1943 deeds are conce'rned the defendant Marie 
T. Anderson Johnson was defending as an heir of the 
deceased. If the plaintiffs had established the validity 
of the 1943 deeds, then they would have taken from the 
estate all of its assets. The defendant, as an heir of 
the deceased, was defending :against their claim. She 
defended on the grounds that these deeds were never 
legally delivered and that therefore the property be-
longed to the deceased up to 1949. -And she further 
claimed that if the 1949 deeds were also invalid, as 
claimed by plaintiffs, then the property belonged to the 
deceased at the time of his death; likewise the plain-
tiffs claimed that if the 1943 deeds were invalid for lack 
of delivery, that the 1949 deeds were also invalid, and 
the property belonged- to the estate.- It seems there-:-
fore, clear to us that the plaintiffs, by their .action, 
were making an assault upon the estate and. that they 
were directly interested in the event thereof. It also 
seems equally clear that in the defense of the 1943 
deeds the defendant was defending. as against the vali-
dity of these deeds as an heir of the deceased. The sta-
tute applies, not only when th.e adverse party to the 
action sues or defends as an executor or administra-
tor, but it also applies equally when the adverse party 
sues or defends as an heir of the deceased person. Para~ 
phrasing the language used 'by this court in the case of 
Rasmussen vs. Sevier Valley Canal 
Company 
40 Utah 371, 121 Pac. 741, 
the plaintiffs and each of them were interested in the 
event thereof. They were suing the only other h~ir of 
the deceased. She was defending said suit as an. heir-
and under the statute the plaintiffs and each of them 
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were incompetent to testify to any fact which was 
equally within their knowledge and that of the decedent 
unless they were called on behalf. of the defendant heir. 
We think that this case is governed by 
Clark vs. Clark 
74 .utah 290 
279 Pac. 502. 
As we understand counsel for appellants, he does not 
deny the fact that the evidence sought to be obtained 
frqm the four plaintiffs was equally within their know-
ledge and the knowledge of the decedent. So it is merely 
a question of whether or not the prohibition of t4e sta-
tute applied in this case with respect to the proffered 
evidence of the plaintiffs. The fact that there are two 
sets of deeds involved in this case somewhat compli-
cates the situation. It seems to us clearly that had there 
been no deeds executed in 1949, the position of defen-
dants would be unassailable. The only question, it 
seems to us, is whether or not, in· view of the fact that 
tne defendant claims as a grantee of the deceased under 
a subsequent. set .of deeds in any way changes her posi-
tion in so far as her defense regarding the 1943 deeds 
is concerned. We do not believe the fact that there 
were other subsequent deeds executed in 1949 in any 
way changes her position, when she is opposing the 
validity of the 1943 deeds as an heir of the deceased 
and when she is claiming that these deeds are invalid, 
and when, as noted supra, the plaintiffs are making a 
direct assault on the estate by claiming ownership in 
this· property by reason of. the alleged delivery of the 
deeds in question. 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
With that thought in mind we stated our f>osition 
very frankly to the court. It was, that when defendant 
:Marie T. Johnson sought to establish the validity of the 
1949 deeds then she was in precisely the same position 
as the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were in precisely 
the same position as the defendant, that is that they 
would then be defending as against the 1949 deeds as 
heirs of the deceased and therefore the defendants 
would likewise be prohibited under the statute from 
testifying to any fact concerning the 1949 deeds which 
was equally within their knowledge and that of the 
decedent. In the trial of the case the transcript will 
disclose that no attempt was made by the defendants 
to testify to any facts concerning the execution and 
delivery of the 1949 deeds which was equally within 
their knowledge and that of the decedent, except as to 
some matters which were brought out by the plaintiffs' 
counsel in his asserted right of cross-examination. We 
have read the :Maxfield vs. Sainsbury case relied upon 
by appellants and we can see nothing in this case which 
in our opinion supports appellants' position. 
We contend, therefore, that the court correctly 
interpreted the statute when he held that neither of 
the plaintiffs could testify as to any fact which was 
equally within their knowledge and that of the decedent 
concerning the 1943 deeds. We shall have more to say 
hereafter regarding the question of whether or not the 
court adhered to his ruling. 
Point 2. The other point raised by appellants is 
with respect to the ruling of the trial court concerning 
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the right of plaintiffs to call the defendants on cross-
examination and to pursue this cross-examination con-
cerning alleged facts equally within the knowledge of 
the deceased and the defendants. Reverting to the 
statute, it expressly provides that no person can be a 
witness when the adverse party to such action claims 
or opposes, sues or defends as an heir as to any matter 
of fact which must have been equally within the know-
ledge of both the witness and the deceased, unless such 
witness is called to testify thereto by such adverse 
party so claiming or opposing, suing or defending in 
such action. In other words, the statute does not say 
that the evidence is incompetent. The statute says the 
person cannot be a witness as to such matters unless 
such witness is called by the executor, administrator, 
heir, legatee or devisee who is defending the action. In 
other words, with respect to the 1943 deeds, the defend-
ant who was defending as [13'ainst their valiaity was the 
only person who could call a d1sqaalified witness to 
testify concerning matters equally within the know-
ledge of the deceased and the witness. That is a right 
which is accorded the executor or heir who is defending 
and is not a right accorded to the person who is mak-
ing an assault upon the estate. The defendants were 
placed in a peculiar position in this case when they 
were called by the plaintiffs for cross-examnation. As 
their attorney, the writer was confronted with a situa-
tion as to whether he should o hject to the competency of 
the witness or not. If counsel stood by and permitted this 
cross-examination without objection, then the quest-
tion would arise as to whether or not defendant thereby 
waived the benefit of the statute. If such examination 
without objection could be deemed to be a waiver then 
' 8 
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of course it would open up the whole subject and would 
permit plaintiffs to go into the matters elicited on the 
cross-examination. Prior to the adoption of the new 
rules plaintiffs could not have called defendants for a 
cross-examination unless defendants had taken the stand 
and testified regarding some matter or fact equally 
within the knowledg·e of the witness and the deceased. 
In other words, defendant would have the right, not 
the plaintiff, to determine whether or not she chose to 
open up the question and thereby waive the statute. 
Plaintiffs seem to contend that under the new rules 
they can force a defendant to waive this privilege by 
the expediency of cross-examination. The new rules 
do not purport to in any way change, modify or a bro-
gate the dead man's statute and we do not believe it 
was the intent of the legislature to repeal, modify or 
change this statute by implication. The question squarely 
presented, therefore, is whether or not a plaintiff can 
call an adm~ni3trator or heir by cross-examination and 
force such person to answer concerning matters which 
the defendant as such administrator of heir may claim 
the belief. 
We further contend that, if erroneous, no prejudi-
cial error resulted from the ruling of the court because 
the court thereafter permitted plaintiffs to pursue in 
a searching and persistent cross-examination of both 
of the defendants with respect to the 1943 deeds. See 
Transcript, pages 198 to 204, cross-examination of Ches-
ter N. Johnson, and Transcript, pages 117 to 129 and 
pages 205 to 217, cross-examination of Marie T. John-
son. Certainly the court permitted plaintiffs' counsel 
unlimited rights of cross-examinaton. We contend, 
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therefore, that the court correctly construed the sta-
tute both with respect to the proffered testimony of the 
plaintiffs, which was rejected, and to the proffered 
testimony of the defendants elicited on cross-examina-
tion, but. that in any event the court subsequently re-
ceded from his previous ruling, to the point where he 
permitted counsel full and complete latitude in his cross-
examination of the defendants. 
RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL 
POINTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF HAVING CON-
SIDERED OTHER AND ADDITIONAL MATTERS 
THAN THOSE RAISED BY APPELLANTS 
The court erred in the following respects: 
1. Notwithstanding the trial court ruled that the 
dead man's statute prevented plaintiffs from testifying 
as to matters equally within the knowledge of plain-
tiffs and the deceased respecting the alleged 1943 deeds, 
yet the court erroneously permitted plaintiffs to test-
ify at great length concerning "matters of fact" and 
"transactions with the deceased in relation thereto" 
which were equally within the knowledge of the witness 
and the deceased. 
2. The court erred in permitting plaintiffs' attorney 
to pursue a prolonged and searching inquiry of the 
defendant Marie T. Johnson as to what she believed 
concerning the validity of the 1943 deeds and likewise 
erred in permitting plaintiffs' attorney to pursue the 
same cross-examination with respect to what the defend-
ant Chester N. Johnson believed concerning the vali-
dity of the 1943 deeds. 
10 
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3. The court erred in overruling defendants' motion 
for dismissal and for not granting defendants' motion 
to withdraw from the jury any issue as to mental inca-
pacity and for not granting defendants' motion with-
drawing from the jury the issue of undue influence and 
also in denying defendants' motion for a directed ver-
dict. 
4. The court erred in failing to give the following 
instructions requested by the defendants: Requested 
instructions numbered 1, 4 and 5. 
We desire to briefly discuss defendants' additional 
points for the purpose of having this court consider 
these matters in its opinion. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT 1. NOTWITHSTAND-
iNG THE TRIAL COURT RULED THAT THE DEAD 
~fAN'S STATUTE PREVENTED PLAINTIFFS 
FRO~I TESTIFYIXG AS TO :MATTERS EQUALLY 
WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PLAIN· 
TIFFS AND THE DECEASED RESPECTING THE 
ALLEGED 1943 DEEDS, YET THE COURT ERRO-
NEOUSLY PERMITTED PLAINTIFFS TO TEST-
IFY AT GREAT LENGTH CONCERNING MATTERS 
OF FACT AND TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEASED 
IN RELATION THERETO WHICH WERE 
EQUALLY WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
WITNESS AND THE DECEASED. 
If respondents are correct in their contention that 
the dead man's statute applied as to the plaintiffs and 
prohibited them from testifying concerning matters 
and facts and transactions with the deceased equally 
11 
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within their knowledge and the· knowledge of the de-
ceased, then we think it must inevitably follow that the 
court erred in subsequently admitting testimony of the 
plaintiffs concerning facts and transactions with and 
which must have been equally within the knowledge of 
the deceased and the witness so testifying. See Tr. 103 
to 108 relative to the ruling of the court. N otwith-
standing the court's ruling he thereafter permitted 
these plaintiffs to testify concerning matters, facts 
and transactions which were equally within the know-
ledge of the witness so testifying and the deceased con-
cerning the 1943 deeds. See testimony of George N. 
Anderson commencing at page 109 to 117; testimony 
of Imogene Anderson, Tr. 157 to 160 and 161 to 171. 
See also Tr. 180 to 184, subsequent ruling of the court; 
testimony of Lorenzo W. Anderson, Jr., Tr. 137 to 151. 
As we construe the statute, the incompetency of 
the witness is much broader than merely prohibiting 
conversations between the deceased and the witness. 
The statute makes this very clear because the prohibi-
tion extends to ''any statement by or transaction with 
such deceased, or matter of fact whatever which must 
have been· equally within the knowledge of both the 
witness and such deceased person. '' We desire to call 
attention specifically to the concurring opinion of Mr. 
Justice Wolfe in the case of Maxfield vs. Sainsbury 
concerning thi:3 rna tter. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT 2. THE COURT ERRED 
IN PERMITTNG PLAINTIFFS' ATTORNEY TO 
PURSUE .A PROLONGED AND SEARCHING 
INQ.UIRY OF THE DEFENDANT MARIE T. JOHN-
SON AS TO WHAT SHE BELIE1VED CONCERNING 
12 
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THE VALIDITY OF THE 1943 DEEDS AND LII\:E-
WISE ERRED IN PER~IITTING PLAINTIFFS' 
ATTORNEY TO PURSUE THE SAME KIND OF 
CROSS-EXAi\IINATION WITH R E S P E C T TO 
WHAT THE DEFENDANT CHESTER N. JOHN-
SON BELIEVED CONCERNING THE VALIDITY 
OF THESE DEEDS. 
See cross-examination of :Marie T. Johnson, com-
mencing on page 215. See also cross-examination of 
Chester N. Johnson, page 201 to 205. It is our theory 
that much of this cross-examination was improper for 
the reason that no evidence on direct examination was 
offered concerning the matter. It is also our view that 
the cross-examination as to what the defendants may 
have believed concerning the validity or the non-vali-
dity of these deeds is entirely immaterial. Many people 
erroneously believe that an undelivered executed deed 
passes a good title on death. The only question which 
the jury was called upon to determine was the intent 
of the grantor, not the belief of the grantees. 
RESPONDENTS' POINT 3. THE COURT 
E R R E D IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' 
~fOTION FOR DIS:\IISSAL AND FOR NOT GRANT-
ING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO WITHDRAW 
FRO~I THE JURY ANY ISSUE AS TO MENTAL 
INCAPACITY AND FOR NOT GRANTING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION WITHDRAWING FROM THE JURY 
THE ISSUE OF UNDUE INFLUENCE AND ALSO 
IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT. 
13 
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At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case respondents 
moved the court for a dismissal of plaintiffs' case on 
the theory that there was no evidence to submit to the 
jury either: 
1. That the deceased had delivered the 1943 deeds; 
or 
2. That the deceased had failed to deliver the 1949 
deeds; or 
3. That deceased at the time of the execution thereof 
was mentally incompetent or acting under undue 
influence. 
The court denied the motion. We confidently 
believe that a review of the plaintiffs' evidence fails 
to disclose any evidence upon which the court, as a 
trier of the facts, or the jury, could find a valid legal 
delivery of the 1943 deeds. The evidence discloses the 
following undisputed facts evidencing non-delivery: 
1. At the time he signed the 1943 deeds, deceased 
was in good health. No suggestion is made as to why, 
at that time, he would want to divest himself of all of 
his property thereby leaving him destitiute. 
2. He retained no life estate in the property. 
3. The deeds were never recorded. 
4. He thereafter continued to treat the property 
as his own, collecting and retaining the rents, enter-
ing into leases of the Promontory property, signing 
a right-of-way agreement with his brother Cephus on 
the Garland property, paying the taxes and exercising 
generally all right of ownership. 
14 
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5. The possession of these deeds was retained by 
the deceased. He kept them in a special compartment 
in his own desk in his own home. 
Each and all of these facts, which are undisputed, 
in the absenee of evidence to the contrary, shows con-
clu~iYely that the deceased never intended a delivery 
of the deeds. The evidence further shows that during 
his lifetime decedent had made many deeds. One time 
making his wife grantee, another time making 1\fa.rie 
grantee. In fact the evidence shows he made dozens 
of deeds which apparently he considered as merely 
testamentary in character. We contend the evidence 
conclusively shows that when he signed the 1943 deeds 
it was his intent that the same was merely testamentary 
in character and that he did not intend to deliver said 
deeds or to pass any present interest in the property. 
Conversely we contend, with respect to the 1949 
deeds, that the evidence conclusively shows a then 
present intent to make a present delivery of these deeds. 
The testimony of John W. Phillips is conclusive on this 
point. Decedent's declaration to Marie to record her 
deed shows conclusively an intent at that time to make 
an absolute unconditional delivery. 
We further contend that there was no evidence 
upon which the jury could have found either that the 
deceased was incompetent at the time he executed and 
·..- delivered the 1949 deeds or that he was acting under 
duress or undue influence. If the court was correct 
> in denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, he should 
have granted the motion to withdraw these issues from 
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the jury. With respect to incompetency, there was evi-
dence, which is not disputed, that in 1947 or there-
bouts the deceased suffered a stroke and that he was 
very ill. It is conceded that there were times during 
that period when his mind was affected. However 
' there was no evidence of any mental incapacity at the 
time he signed the 1949 deeds. It was admitted by 
everyone that his health greatly improved, and the 
testimony of John W. Phillips, Dr. Moskowitz, his 
brother Cephus Anderson to the effect that at the time 
he signed the deeds his mind was clear and that he 
understood and fully appreciated the nature of the 
act which he was doing, stands undisputed in this record. 
RE/SPONDENTS' POINT 4. THE COURT ERRED 
IN FAILING TO GIVE DEFENDANTS' 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 1, 4 and 5. 
We have already discussed the matters covered by 
defendant's requested instruction number 1 for a 
directed verdict. If there was evidence of mental incap-
acity or undue influence, then the court should have 
given to the jury defendants' requested instructions 
number 4 and 5. We do not believe that the court in 
his instructions covered the matters contained in either 
of these requests and we also believe that the requested 
instructions contain a correct statement of the law. 
We contend that the errors assigned by appellants for 
a reversal cannot be sustained and that the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
THATCHER & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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